BRODEUR (STUDENT NOTE) - FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE)

3/3/2017 3:54 PM

SHAREHOLDERS AS STAKEHOLDERS:
A FUTURE PARADIGM FOR INSTITUTIONAL
ACTIVISM IN JAPAN
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ABSTRACT
Over the last quarter century, the landscape of Japanese corporate
governance has been overhauled by a combination of domestic reform,
financial collapse, and foreign influence. Amidst these changes, institutional
investors have claimed a growing role within Japanese listed companies, not
only as monitors of management but as crucial agents for corporate
governance reform. In this new role, institutional investors have adopted a
diverse array of strategies and tactics for their dealings with management.
This paper explores the future contours of Japanese shareholder activism
against the backdrop of Japan’s twenty-first century corporate evolution. In
particular, it analyzes how Japan’s modern corporate governance regime
alters the behavior of institutional investors, and in turn the nature of their
engagements with management of Japanese companies. Due to recent
changes in Japanese law, Japan’s current governance standards limit the
effectiveness of “aggressive” institutional activists. Rather than encourage
contentious, highly public battles between adversarial activists and target
companies, Japan’s current regime limits the opportunities for investment
available to aggressive institutional investors by encouraging constructive
engagement between investors and management. Although the quest for
profits will continue to influence the behavior of investors and managers,
Japan’s current regime invites institutions to act not only as profit-seeking
shareholders, but also as stakeholders invested in the long-term financial
stability of listed companies.
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INTRODUCTION
Change is afoot in the Land of the Rising Sun. Over the last quarter
century, Japanese corporate governance has been transformed by domestic
reform, financial collapse and foreign influence. In addition to government
efforts to enhance corporate accountability, financial collapse during the
1990s exposed Japan’s equity market to foreign investment and the
importation of Western governance mechanisms. Against this backdrop, the
role of institutional investors in Japanese society has drawn public interest
for a variety of reasons. Scandals and managerial misconduct have plagued
several of Japan’s most influential corporations1 and have underscored the
necessity of effective managerial oversight. These developments highlight
the importance of investors as independent, external monitors of
management. Additionally, Japanese governance has long been criticized for
1. See, e.g., Bruce Aronson, The Olympus Scandal and Corporate Governance Reform: Can
Japan Find a Middle Ground Between the Board Monitoring Model and Management Model?, 30 PAC.
BASIN L.J. 93, 106–14 (2012) (describing a financial reporting scandal and ensuing investigation at
Olympus Corporation in 2011); Yuki Hagiwara & Matthew Campbell, Mitsubishi Motors’ Scandal Was
an Accident Waiting to Happen, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 18, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-05-18/mitsubishi-motors-scandal-was-an-accident-waiting-to-happen [https://perma.
cc/V7XG-Q72J] (documenting misstatements of fuel economy and testing standards by Mitsubishi
Motors Corporation in 2016).
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“lagging behind” the Western world,2 and the country has historically lacked
institutions capable of monitoring and exerting meaningful pressure on
corporate insiders.
In response to these concerns, institutional investors have emerged as
agents of reform. Domestic institutions including Japan’s Pension Fund
Association and Strategic Capital, Inc., as well as foreign institutions such
as Steel Partners Holdings L.P., The Children’s Investment Fund, Effissimo
Capital and Third Point, LLC, have played a pivotal role in Japan’s corporate
transformation by pressing for reform within target companies. Each
institution has adopted unique strategies, a “model” of activism, for its
engagement with Japanese companies.
This paper explores the future contours of Japanese shareholder
activism in light of the country’s twenty-first century corporate evolution.
Part I frames our discussion with a brief explanation of Japan’s corporate
governance transformation—from a traditional firm-centric culture of
“internalism,” to a modern regime trending toward shareholder primacy. Part
II introduces several of Japan’s prominent foreign and domestic institutional
investors and analyzes their specific engagements with Japanese listed
companies. These institutions and their strategies illustrate several “models”
of activism implemented in Japan—adversarial or “public” activism,
constructive or “quiet” activism and collaborative activism. Part II serves as
a useful backdrop to discuss and critique two of Japan’s twenty-first century
corporate developments introduced in Part III, namely (a) the publication of
guidelines in 2005 by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and
Ministry of Justice for legitimate defensive maneuvers by management
within Japanese companies, and (b) legislative reform in 2015 encouraging
independent board membership, heightened accountability and greater
dialogue with shareholders among Japanese firms. These byproducts of
Japan’s corporate evolution are likely to influence the future of institutional
activism. In conclusion, Part IV draws an inference as to the future contours
of Japanese institutional activism based on connections between Japan’s
corporate reform and the likely future interactions between activist investors
and management.
This paper sets out to analyze how Japan’s modern corporate
governance regime will alter engagements between activist institutional
investors and management. Scholars of Japanese law have recognized that
the future of the country’s corporate governance regime depends on the

2. Takako Taniguchi, Japan ‘30 Years Behind’ in Corporate Governance, THE JAPAN TIMES
(May 31, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/31/national/japan-30-years-behind-corporat
e-governance-top-u-s-money-manager-says/#.V9U0lGVlmu7 [https://perma.cc/BZ3U-VRZM].
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evolution of shareholder-management relations.3 I adopt the inverse
perspective: namely, that Japan’s modern corporate governance regime is
primed to influence interactions between institutional investors and
management of Japanese target companies. This new regime could well
impact the future balance of power between “models” of institutional
activism. In sharp contrast to Western regimes, Japan’s current governance
standards mitigate the effectiveness of aggressive activism. Rather than
encourage contentious, highly public battles between adversarial activists
and target boards, Japan’s current regime limits the effectiveness of
aggressive institutional activism by encouraging constructive engagements
between investors and management. Although the quest for profits will
continue to influence the behavior of investors and managers, Japan’s current
regime invites institutions to act not only as profit-seeking shareholders, but
also as stakeholders invested in the long-term financial stability of listed
companies.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
While foreign institutional investors have assumed a substantial role in
shaping contemporary Japanese corporate governance, the country today is
vastly different in several important respects from Japan in the mid-twentieth
century. The following section documents the evolution of Japan’s corporate
sphere in response to several sources of change. Beyond the direct influence
of government reform over the last fifteen years, corporate evolution has
been driven by financial collapse during the 1990s and an increase in foreign
investment since the turn of the twenty-first century.4
A. Japan’s Traditional Conception of the Corporation—A “Community
Firm”
Since the 1950s, Japanese corporate governance has revolved around a
unique conception of the corporation as a “community firm.”5 At its core,
the “community firm” ideal rested on the assumption that companies were
“comprised of a community of stakeholders rather than being the
shareholders’ property.”6 As such, corporations were historically conceived
3. See Takaya Seki & Thomas Clarke, The Evolution of Corporate Governance in Japan: The
Continuing Relevance of Berle and Means, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 717, 719 (2014).
4. Sanford M. Jacoby, Foreign Investors and Corporate Governance in Japan, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGERIAL REFORM IN JAPAN 93, 94 (D. Hugh Whittaker & Simon Deakin eds.,
2009).
5. See generally JOHN BUCHANAN ET AL., HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM IN JAPAN: THE LIMITS OF
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 107–13 (2013) (describing the “community firm” idea which “became the
principal distinguishing feature of Japan’s post-1945 corporate governance” regime).
6. Jacoby, supra note 4, at 93.
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as “stable social system[s] not run primarily for the benefit of shareholders,”
but rather run to promote internal goals and embody the values of employees,
managers and creditors.7 Japanese companies “[were] regarded not as
money-making machines but as self-perpetuating institutions . . . expected
to pursue ‘service to society’ first and profits second.”8 Scholars have
described traditional corporate Japan as a realm “of stable, friendly
shareholders, expansive views of corporate purpose . . . beyond shareholder
wealth maximization, and abiding social concern for the preservation of
harmonious relationships.”9
With shareholder wealth assuming only marginal importance, Japanese
governance promoted “internalism” and emphasized duties to the company
rather than stakeholders.10 Most traditional firms were controlled “at all
levels by long-serving, internally promoted managers who identif[ied] with
the company’s interests because they belong[ed] to a cohesive and rewarding
‘community firm.’”11 These managers were similar to “winners of a fierce
competition for internal promotion”12 and relied on internal company
knowledge to guide their business decisions in lieu of external pressure or
guidance.13 Traditional Japanese companies therefore differed from their
American counterparts: whereas American firms relied on directors as
monitors of management, the directors of Japanese firms were the
management and consequently had free reign over business decisions.14
In addition to a lack of internal monitoring, traditional Japanese firms
also resisted outside influence. The historical role of kansayaku (internal
“corporate” or “statutory auditors”) illustrates the reluctance of Japanese
firms to expose internal “community” cultures to external influence.
Although kansayaku have long served as the primary monitors of
management and accounting decisions within Japanese listed companies,15
7. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 108–09.
8. Takeovers in Japan: Hostility, of Sorts, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.economis
t.com/node/10331522 [https://perma.cc/8J8U-LC7N].
9. Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2172 (2005).
10. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 109.
11. TAKESHI INAGAMI & D. HUGH WHITTAKER, THE NEW COMMUNITY FIRM: EMPLOYMENT,
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT REFORM IN JAPAN 3–5 (2005).
12. TOSHIAKI TACHIBANAKI, WHO RUNS JAPANESE BUSINESS? MANAGEMENT AND MOTIVATION
IN THE FIRM 249 (1998).
13. SIMON LEARMOUNT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM JAPAN? 136
(2002).
14. Aronson, supra note 1, at 95.
15. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 111. Kansayaku remain employed in most modern
Japanese firms, albeit not in firms that have established “audit committees” under the optional
“committee” system of governance introduced by amendments to Japan’s Commercial Code in 2003.
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they were historically marginalized and limited in their capacity to challenge
upper management.16 Rather than holding independent positions as
disinterested external monitors, kansayaku were often drawn from the ranks
of former employees or directors of the firm or its subsidiaries.17 Instead of
demanding accountability of directors and upper management, kansayaku
merely emphasized legal compliance by employees.18 Kansayaku have
achieved greater independence in recent years,19 but their past subordination
illustrates the tradition of “internalism” that has rendered corporate Japan
reluctant to entertain external perspectives or influence to this day.
With little in the way of foreign influence, Japanese governance was
shaped by domestic financial activity and the dynamics of the keiretsu—
”groups of allied firms organized around a main bank” typically “own[ing]
substantial quantities of each other’s shares.”20 Cross-ownership
arrangements such as keiretsu insulated management from outside
shareholders, provided boards of directors an early defense mechanism
against takeovers, and facilitated information sharing among “business
groups” of firms.21 Perhaps most importantly, keiretsu mitigated the
influence of market discipline in traditional Japanese firms. Management
was relieved of the need to obsess over stock prices, market confidence, or
short-term profitability, since firms relied primarily on loans from a main
bank rather than equity from investors.22 With practical immunity from
external influence, Japanese corporate governance developed throughout the
twentieth century with a clear emphasis on the interests of management,
employees, and creditors, rather than shareholders.

16. Id. (“[Kansayaku] . . . [became] co-opted into the corporate structure. A senior director at a very
large company . . . interviewed in 2004 admitted they were not an effective check on management: ‘Our
corporate auditors are legally obliged to supervise the directors but in practice they are tied up with lower
level stuff, what you might call operational matters, and they are busy checking fine details of daily
business.’”).
17. Id.
18. Aronson, supra note 1, at 99 n.57.
19. An amendment in 2002 to the Japanese Commercial Code has empowered kansayaku by
requiring Japanese listed companies to have “at least three corporate auditors, of whom at least half [must]
be persons who [have] not been either directors or employees of the company or its subsidiaries.”
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 112.
20. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008, at 59
(2009).
21. Yaron Nili, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A New Approach to Shareholder Activism, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 188–89 (2014).
22. See KRUGMAN, supra note 20, at 59.
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B. The “Lost Decade” & the Financial Sector’s Waning Influence Over
Corporate Governance
Japan’s financial sector traditionally enjoyed considerable influence
over corporate governance. As the financial centerpiece of the keiretsu
framework, the financial sector maintained dominant ownership in domestic
listed companies and exercised considerable influence over corporate
governance; often at the expense of other investors.23 As recently as 1990,
financial institutions owned forty-three percent of the overall value in
Japan’s equity market.24 In the same year, business corporations (likely as
part of keiretsu or cross-shareholding) held the next highest percentage
ownership of Japan’s equity market, at thirty percent of overall market
value.25
Despite its longstanding impact on corporate governance, Japan’s
keiretsu framework unraveled during the 1990s and 2000s with the onset of
the “lost decade”—a period of systemic, nationwide financial collapse.26
Japan had experienced decades of rapid growth following World War II, but
asset prices skyrocketed in the late 1980s, due primarily to excessive loan
growth quotas, or lending targets, imposed by the Bank of Japan.27 To satisfy
the central bank’s lending quotas, Japanese banks “lent more, with less
regard for quality of the borrower” than banks in any other country.28
Excessive lending fueled severe inflation. When the Bank of Japan raised
interbank lending rates in 1989 to restrict market liquidity and curb
inflation,29 asset prices plummeted, Japan’s stock market crashed and
widespread financial collapse ensued. Scholars and economists have credited
a variety of contributing factors for the collapse, but one factor, in particular,
relates directly to the internal “community firm” ideology that was pervasive
among traditional Japanese firms: a “cozy relationship” had developed
among government, banks and Japanese firms, and an expectation of bailouts
from government-backed banks to financially-distressed companies created
significant moral hazard problems.30 Banks therefore had little incentive to
23. See Nili, supra note 21, at 188.
24. TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., TSE-LISTED COMPANIES SHAREOWNERSHIP SURVEY 2015
tbl.3 [hereinafter TSE 2015 SHAREOWNERSHIP SURVEY], http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/markets/statistics
-equities/examination/b5b4pj00000154dp-att/e-bunpu2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL87-F7T3].
25. Id.
26. Nili, supra note 21, at 189.
27. W.R. GARSIDE, JAPAN’S STAGNATION: FORGING AHEAD, FALLING BEHIND 77 (2012)
(documenting the reaction of Japanese commercial banks to Bank of Japan lending quotas).
28. KRUGMAN, supra note 20, at 66.
29. Japan Raises Interest Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/2
5/business/japan-raises-interest-rates.html [https://perma.cc/VJ2H-PHMB].
30. KRUGMAN, supra note 20, at 60.
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mitigate credit risk and widespread reductions in lending standards propelled
the financial collapse. In a sense, the protections of the keiretsu framework
contributed to its own demise.
The “lost decade” left Japan’s financial sector in shambles; many banks
were bailed out with government capital infusions or cheap credit from the
Bank of Japan. The resulting economic fragility severed ties between banks
and corporate borrowers, and the financial sector ceded its long held
influence over Japanese corporate governance. The sector’s waning
influence is highlighted by share ownership data collected by the Tokyo
Stock Exchange (“TSE”). The TSE’s data indicate that financial institutions’
percentage share of Japan’s equity market has decreased from a high of 43%
in 1990 to 27.9% in 2015.31 On a unit-of-share basis, the percentage of shares
owned by financial institutions decreased from 45.2% to 24.8% during the
same period.32 Among financial institutions, city and regional banks
experienced the greatest decline in percentage market share—from 15.7% in
1990 to 3.7% in 2015.33 As discussed below, the financial sector’s declining
market share can be explained primarily by a substantial increase in the
percentage of foreign shareholdings.34
C. The Emergence of Activist Investment & the Murakami Fund
At the onset of the twenty-first century, foreign investment emerged to
fill the void left by Japan’s weakened financial sector. Japan has been
considered an unlikely playing field for activist institutional investors.35 In
the majority of countries, foreign activism is impractical because few, if any,
domestic institutions are available and willing to cooperate with investors
from abroad. Foreign activists are often portrayed as overly aggressive and
threatening toward domestic companies.36 Additionally, there is typically a
lack of historical guidance or a model approach for institutional activism in
foreign countries. Despite Japan’s efforts to jumpstart economic growth and
31. TSE 2015 SHAREOWNERSHIP SURVEY, supra note 24, at tbl.3.
32. Id. at Ref. tbl.2.
33. Id. at tbl.3.
34. See id. (illustrating an increase in the percentage market share held by “Foreigners” from 4.7%
in 1990 to 29.8% in 2015).
35. Bruce E. Aronson, A Japanese CalPERS or a New Model for Institutional Investor Activism?
Japan’s Pension Fund Association and The Emergence of Shareholder Activism in Japan, 7 N.Y.U. J. L.
& BUS. 571, 577–78 (2011).
36. Samurai v. Shareholders: Japan’s Establishment Continues to Rebuff Foreign Activist
Investors, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 14, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/10698467 [https://perma.c
c/D6P6-43XE] (“Japanese businessmen and politicians fear that the activists are short-term investors keen
to strip firms of their cash. The conflict highlights a fundamental divide: companies in Japan are social
institutions with a duty to provide stable employment and consider the needs of employees and the
community at large, not just shareholders.”).
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invite foreign investment,37 the country’s corporate milieu poses unique
obstacles to activism by foreign shareholders.
Beyond the reluctance of domestic firms’ to expose their internal affairs
to outside investors,38 Japan’s foreign exchange and trade laws have limited
foreign investment in key industries.39 Under the Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Act,40 any foreign investor intending to make an “inward
direct investment”41 in a Japanese corporation must notify in advance and
receive permission for the transaction from the Minister of Finance and any
other ministry with jurisdiction over the target corporation.42 The Act has
had a broad impact on foreign investment in Japanese companies. For
example, in 2008, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(“METI”) issued a recommendation effectively preventing a British hedge
fund from doubling its ownership from 9.9% to 20% in Electric Power
Development Co. (“J-Power”), an electricity wholesaler and formerly
government-owned public utility.43 The METI opposed the fund’s increased
ownership out of concern that it could disrupt J-Power’s capital investment
in nuclear power plants and threaten national security.44 In addition to
37. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has adopted a “three-pronged approach”—Abenomics—
to stimulate economic growth. The third prong emphasizes structural corporate governance reform to
attract foreign investment in Japanese companies. See Japan’s Economy is Back to Where it Started,
STRATFOR (Jul. 12, 2016), https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/japans-economy-back-where-it-started
[https://perma.cc/578E-V7GV].
38. Kana Inagaki, Japan is Hostile to Activist Investors, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324216004578482943175923954 [https://perma.cc/54
74-NQTT] (“Big Japanese investors have generally circled the wagons to protect companies—with which
they often had deep shareholding and business ties—from intervention by outsiders. Historically, those
networks of big investors held large enough stakes that they could prevent hostile campaigns from
succeeding.”).
39. In 2008, Japanese foreign exchange law required foreign investors to seek government approval
before seeking a stake of ten percent or more in electric utilities or other companies related to “national
security” and “public order.” The law authorized government regulators to issue orders or
recommendations requiring foreign investors to drop or alter their acquisition plans. British Fund Faces
Limit on its Stake in J-Power, THE JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 6, 2008), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/
04/06/business/british-fund-faces-limit-on-its-stake-in-j-power/#.V-EeVWVlmu4 [https://perma.cc/GG
V8-QY68].
40. 外国為替及び外国貿易法 [Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act], Act No. 228 of Dec.
1, 1949 [hereinafter Japanese Foreign Exchange and Trade Act].
41. The Act’s definition of “inward direct investment” includes any acquisition of shares in a
Japanese listed corporation in which at least ten percent of the corporation’s shares will be held by a nonresident individual after completion of the acquisition. See id. at art. 26(2)(iii).
42. Id. at art. 27(1).
43. Funds Lose Against J-Power and NipponKoa, N. Y. TIMES (June 26, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/business/worldbusiness/26iht-activist.1.14007959.html [https://per
ma.cc/93XK-2A5R].
44. British Fund Faces Limit on its Stake in J-Power, supra note 39. Japan’s Foreign Exchange
and Foreign Trade Act specifically authorizes the Japanese government to “take countermeasures . . .
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regulatory protection, foreign investors have encountered formidable
cultural friction during aggressive engagements with Japanese firms. In
2010, Steel Partners Holdings L.P., a U.S.-based hedge fund well-known for
its aggressive strategies, sold its shares in Sapporo Holdings Ltd. after
“battling for corporate reform and management overhaul”45 for nearly five
years.46 The fund has since exited the Japanese market after fully divesting
its ownership in Aderans Holdings Co. Ltd. in 2015.47
Despite these political and cultural obstacles, foreign institutional
investors have nonetheless assumed a growing role within Japanese listed
corporations. The percentage market value of Japanese equity held by
foreigners has increased from a mere 4.7% in 1990 to 29.8% in 2015.48 This
shift is due in large part to the emergence of domestic Japanese funds in the
1980s who first employed activist tactics by purchasing shares “in
underperforming or undervalued companies with a view to profiting from
subsequent improvements in their performance.”49 Most of these funds,
including Sparx Asset Management and Tower Investment Management,
have maintained their stakes in listed Japanese firms without resorting to
Western-style confrontation or intervention.50 In contrast, M&A Consulting,
one of several investment vehicles originated by Yoshiaki Murakami (known
collectively as the “Murakami Fund”), employed a highly-public,
confrontational style of engagement.51
The Murakami Fund made a splash in January of 2000 when it initiated
a hostile tender offer valued at roughly ¥1.41 billion for Shoei Corporation,
a Japanese industrial and real estate company with an electronic parts
manufacturing wing.52 Mr. Murakami criticized the company’s “inefficient
management,” and justified his intervention as a means to address Shoei’s
unnecessary real estate operations, crippling debt and “unusually large

when it is particularly necessary in order to maintain peace and security in Japan.” See Japanese Foreign
Exchange and Trade Act, art. 10(1).
45. Inagaki, supra note 38.
46. Letter from Warren G. Lichtenstein, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Steel Partners Holdings
L.P., to Shareholders, Steel Partners Holdings L.P. 9 (Mar. 12, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Letter to
Shareholders of Steel Partners].
47. Letter from Warren G. Lichtenstein, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Steel Partners Holdings
L.P., to Shareholders, Steel Partners Holdings L.P. 14 (app. A) (May 18, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Letter
to Shareholders of Steel Partners].
48. See TSE 2015 SHAREOWNERSHIP SURVEY, supra note 24, at tbl.3. The 2015 Survey defines
“Foreigners” as “non-Japanese corporations and individuals.” Id. at tbl.1.
49. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 154.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.

BRODEUR (STUDENT NOTE) - FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

3/3/2017 3:54 PM

SHAREHOLDERS AS STAKEHOLDERS

301

board.”53 Shoei’s domestic shareholders ultimately rebuffed Murakami’s
tender offer and the bid failed, but it was “one of the first postwar hostile
bids for a Japanese corporation by a Japanese corporation.”54 Most
importantly, Murakami demonstrated the feasibility of aggressive activism
in Japan by using Shoei’s annual general meeting to advocate aggressively
for greater shareholder returns and heightened managerial accountability.55
Studies by the Japan Center for Economic Research estimate that
Murakami’s collection of funds maintained shareholdings in as many as
fifty-two Japanese firms by late 2005.56 Additional studies published in NLI
Research in 2007 predict that Murakami intervened in at least 135 listed
companies; likely a conservative estimate given the likelihood of additional
interventions in companies where Murakami avoided disclosure obligations
by holding less than five percent ownership.57
The Murakami Fund ultimately blazed a trail for subsequent waves of
activist shareholders. Although the Fund’s takeover bid failed, its
intervention signaled the dawning of a new era in Japanese corporate
governance. Management could no longer promote narrow internal interests
and feel secure from unwelcome shareholder engagement. In Murakami’s
wake, Japanese companies were targeted by domestic and foreign hedge
funds which used small shareholdings to engage with management on
matters of corporate governance and financial strategies.58 These funds’
tactics exhibited unique characteristics capable of classification into three
general “models” of activism, discussed below. After decades of marketdriven transformation, the stage was set for a heterogeneous, multi-faceted
assault by activist investors on Japan’s traditional corporate landscape.
II. MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Corporate law scholarship offers numerous criteria for assessing the
strategies of institutional activists.59 This paper characterizes Japan’s most
prominent institutional investors based simply on the nature of their

53. Id. at 154–55.
54. Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform? What’s
Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why 13–14 (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 234, 2003).
55. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 155.
56. See id. at 156.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 153.
59. See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 35, at 586–92 (discussing resource and expertise constraints, and
constituency constraints as applied to public pension funds to compare Japan’s Pension Fund Association
with the California Public Employees Retirement System, or “CalPERS”); K.A.D. Camara, Classifying
Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. LAW 219, 229–42 (2005) (classifying institutional investors as either
“market-driven,” “politically-driven,” “socially-driven,” or “multilateral” investors).

BRODEUR (STUDENT NOTE) - FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE)

302

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/3/2017 3:54 PM

[Vol 27:291

engagements with Japanese listed companies and their particular investment
goals. Institutional activism in Japan can be classified into three broad
categories: adversarial or “public” activism, constructive or “quiet” activism,
and collaborative activism. Using these classifications, this paper forecasts
the future contours of engagements between investors and management
given the likely influence of Japan’s recent corporate governance reform.
A. Adversarial or “Public” Activism
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, institutional activists have
often assumed a highly-public, adversarial approach in their engagements
with management. The adversarial model has been employed recently by
institutions such as Steel Partners Holdings L.P., The Children’s Investment
Fund, Strategic Capital, Inc. and Effissimo Capital—hedge funds based in
the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Singapore, respectively.
Adversarial activism can be described in myriad ways, but the approach
generally involves heightened media attention, aggressive proxy voting in
direct opposition to management, publicized communications intended to
invite public scrutiny over disagreements between shareholders and
management and short-term shareholding in expectation of a financial
payout. Among institutional investors, hedge funds have most frequently
employed the adversarial approach; primarily due to their profit-driven
investment goals.60 Most importantly, activist funds generally invest only in
companies with untapped profit potential and they acquire shareholdings
with the narrow goal of exerting pressure on management to enhance
profitability.61
Rather than investing dispersedly across several listed companies,
hedge funds strategically concentrate their investments62 in capital-intensive
companies capable of producing shareholder value. For most funds—and
adversarial activists, generally—activism is profit-driven and shareholding
is simply the vehicle for promoting a pre-meditated agenda to alter the
governance of a company.63 Unlike traditional institutional investors such as

60. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 67 (“Activist hedge funds share the same client base as
other hedge funds, namely wealthy individuals or institutions willing to accept high risk in exchange for
the possibility of high return . . . but in many ways they operate differently from ‘macro funds’ or ‘relative
value funds.’ They do not use automated [investment strategies] . . . Instead, they research individual
companies carefully to locate targets that appear to have the characteristics of latent value they seek and
then undertake controlled investments.”).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 169 (discussing the difficulty of conducting activist campaigns with investments
spread across a variety of listed companies).
63. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1091 (2007).
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pension or private equity funds, hedge funds have little interest in promoting
long-term or systemic change. Instead, they rely on “firm-specific agitation”
to improve corporate performance and extract short-term value for
shareholders.64 Many scholars of Japanese corporate law consider
adversarial activism to have peaked in Japan shortly before the 2008
financial crisis,65 but aggressive engagements have remained common,
particularly in the context of hostile takeover bids. As discussed in Part IV
below, the threat of aggressive takeover bids has led many Japanese firms to
adopt Western-style defensive mechanisms consistent with government
guidelines.
Although it fully divested its Japanese holdings in 2015,66 the
aggressive approach of Steel Partners Holdings L.P. (“Steel Partners”) offers
an iconic example of the adversarial model. In its latest annual letter to
shareholders,67 Steel Partners explained the necessity of an “activist”
approach68 and proclaimed its mission “to work with . . . management teams
to effect catalytic events or, if required, pursue an active strategy and
encourage such catalytic events.”69 Steel Partners’ mission to alter corporate
governance unilaterally has undoubtedly influenced its aggressive
engagements with two Japanese listed companies—Aderans Holdings Co.
Ltd. (“Aderans”), Japan’s largest wig manufacturer, and Sapporo Holdings
Ltd. (“Sapporo”), a Japanese listed global food and beverage manufacturer.70
As a 27.74% owner in Aderans—and the company’s largest
shareholder—Steel Partners leveraged its dominant position in 2009 to stage
a successful proxy campaign and block a tender offer by an outside acquirer
who sought a 35.2% ownership position in Aderans.71 The acquirer’s
proposed offer was for ¥1,000 per share of Aderans stock—a 5.6% discount
to market; Steel Partners opposed the offer as “significantly underpriced.”72
At Aderans’ annual shareholder meeting, the Fund proposed six nominees to
64. See id. at 1091–92.
65. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 166 (“December 2007 represents the high point of hedge
fund activism in Japan. Interventions . . . that had developed into public confrontations were being widely
reported and the full impact of the global financial crisis had not yet affected the funds’ investors.”).
66. See 2015 Letter to Shareholders of Steel Partners, supra note 47, at 14 (app. A).
67. Letter from Warren G. Lichtenstein, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer of Steel Partners
Holdings, L.P. to Shareholders of Steel Partners Holdings, L.P. (Apr. 13, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Letter
to Shareholders of Steel Partners].
68. See id. at 14.
69. See id. (emphasis added).
70. Steel Partners first acquired ownership in Aderans and Sapporo through its investment vehicle,
Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund L.P. (“Steel Partners Japan”) in 2004 and 2005, respectively. See
2010 Letter to Shareholders of Steel Partners, supra note 46, at 8–9.
71. Id. at 8–9.
72. Id. at 8.
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the company’s board of directors and Aderans’ shareholders elected each of
the nominees in a subsequent vote, giving Steel Partners eight directors and
majority board membership.73 With majority board control, Steel Partners
defeated the tender offer and successfully defended its financial stake in
Aderans. The Fund proudly announced that its engagement represented “the
first time in history that a [U.S.] based or foreign investor [had] taken control
of a Japanese company in a contested election and against the wishes of a
management team.”74
Other contentious engagements between Steel Partners and
management have proven less successful. In February of 2007, the Fund
entered into a prolonged struggle with the management of Sapporo Holdings,
Ltd. after initiating a takeover of the company and exercising its 18%
ownership to launch a tender offer for ¥825 per share; a price merely ¥3
below the then-current market value of Sapporo’s stock.75 The offer would
have boosted Steel Partners’ ownership in Sapporo to 66.6%.76 Sapporo’s
board reacted by adopting an “advance warning system” requiring Steel
Partners to respond to questions about its motives for the tender offer and to
solicit management’s approval of the sale.77 The advance warning measure
also included a “dilution clause” allowing the board to issue new shares to
existing shareholders and prevent Steel Partners from acquiring a large stake
in the company.78 The struggle between Steel Partners and Sapporo’s
management continued after Sapporo fell short of sales targets and lost its
position among Japan’s top three domestic brewers in 2008.79 In March of
2010, Steel Partners initiated a proposal to oust Sapporo’s management by
placing six of its own nominees on the ten-person board.80 The proposal was
driven by a “deterioration of [Sapporo’s] corporate and shareholder value,”81
which Steel Partners attributed to “poor management and poor oversight by

73. Id. at 9.
74. Id.
75. Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Sapporo Adopts Defense Against Steel Partners, FORBES (Mar. 29,
2007), http://www.forbes.com/2007/03/29/sapporo-steel-vote-markets-equity-cx_jc_0330markets19.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/K4R9-DYHS].
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See Steel Partners Seeks Support for Its Highly Qualified Director Nominees from Sapporo
Shareholders, BUSINESS WIRE (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100222007
174/en/Steel-Partners-Seeks-Support-Highly-Qualified-Director [https://perma.cc/5MVZ-NLB9].
80. Id.
81. 2010 Letter to Shareholders of Steel Partners, supra note 46, at 9. Sapporo had fallen short of
sales and profit budgets on several occasions since 2002, and in 2008 Sapporo ceded its position among
Japan’s top three domestic brewers. See id.
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the management-controlled Board.”82 The Fund’s proposal ultimately failed
so that after years of public battles with management, Steel Partners sold its
Sapporo holdings in December of 2010.83
Engagements by The Children’s Investment Fund (“TCI”), a British
hedge fund, offer additional examples of adversarial activism. TCI made
extensive use of the Japanese press to highlight its agenda and invite public
pressure on management. This strategy was particularly evident in the
Fund’s attempted tender offer for greater ownership in J-Power.84 In its
dealings with J-Power, TCI’s principal Japanese spokesperson used the
Fund’s regional website and the Japanese press to highlight its agenda for
reform.85 The spokesperson “was interviewed extensively [by] the Japanese
press” and at times “received favorable comment from . . . mainstream
newspapers” with regards to his financial justifications for reorganizing JPower.86 Beyond the adversarial strategies of Steel Partners and TCI,
Strategic Capital, Inc. (“Strategic Capital”) and Effissimo Capital—funds
based in Tokyo and Singapore, respectively—illustrate that adversarial
activism has gained acceptance among non-Western institutions.87
B. Constructive or “Quiet” Activism
Constructive, or “quiet,”88 activism offers a less adversarial brand of
institutional engagement. Constructive activism generally involves informal,
non-public communications with management, decision making based on
objective or criteria-based evaluations of firm performance and an emphasis
on highlighting “good governance” rather than attacking inefficient
82. Id.
83. Naoko Fujimara, Steel Partners Sells Entire Stake in Sapporo Holdings, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16,
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-12-16/lichtenstein-s-steel-partners-sells-its-entire
-stake-in-sapporo-holdings [https://perma.cc/3242-28PA]. The Fund’s exit was widely construed as a
retreat from Sapporo’s hostility toward aggressive, foreign influence. See id.
84. See supra Part I.C.
85. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 183.
86. Id.
87. In April of 2016, Strategic Capital introduced aggressive proposals with a handful of Japanese
companies to lobby for increased dividend payments and the Fund has filed lawsuits against individual
directors for duty violations. See Kathleen Chu & Tom Redmond, This Activist Investor Doesn’t Have
Time for Japan’s Nice Meetings, BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2016-05-09/this-japanese-activist-investor-doesn-t-have-time-for-your-nice-meetings [https://perma.cc/
E7V6-Y76C]. Effissimo Capital has also adopted adversarial tactics by focusing narrowly on portfolio
companies’ financial returns in deciding whether to oppose proposals by management. See Kana Inagaki,
Activist Investors’ Focus on Returns Unsettles Japan CEOs, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REVIEW (Aug. 3, 2016),
http://www.afr.com/business/activist-investors-focus-on-returns-unsettles-japan-ceos-20160803-gqjuug
[https://perma.cc/JNU6-JRN5].
88. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 282 (introducing a contrast between confrontational
activism and an alternative form of “quiet” activism).
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management.89 At its core, the constructive approach rests on a fundamental
belief in the power of market influence. Rather than using aggressive proxy
campaigns or hostile takeover bids to advocate for governance reform,
constructive activists promote industry-wide knowledge of effective
governance, presumably in hopes that firms will alleviate the need for costly
battles between shareholders and management by tailoring their internal
governance to market preferences.
The constructive approach is typified by the Pension Fund Association
(“PFA”), one of Japan’s primary pension funds established in 2004.90 The
PFA manages pension assets for Japanese citizens who have withdrawn from
corporate pension plans and it provides benefit payments by reinvesting
these assets in bonds and portfolio companies.91 At the end of fiscal year
2014, the majority of the PFA’s “basic pension” assets were invested
domestically—41.6% in domestic bonds and 17.2% as equity in domestic
firms compared to 12.8% in foreign bonds and 28.5% in foreign equities.92
The PFA relies on independent asset managers to ensure returns on its
portfolio of investments for its pension holders.93 In evaluating the
governance of portfolio companies, the PFA has provided financiallyoriented and performance based proxy voting standards94 to guide its
managers when exercising the Pension’s shareholder voting rights. For
instance, the PFA opposes the reappointment of directors in companies
where shareholder value has been “impaired” either by business losses or a
failure to pay dividends.95
The PFA’s guidelines are modest by Western standards, but they
“created a stir in Japan,” where pension funds have traditionally avoided
focusing narrowly on shareholder returns.96 The PFA’s proxy voting patterns
89. See Aronson, supra note 35, at 574n.1 (contrasting “activist” hedge funds with the “limited”
activism of pension funds); Nili, supra note 21, at 190 (“[The] constructive activism model is based on
cherry picking examples of good governance to educate the public, investors, and firms as to how
governance should be.”).
90. What is the Pension Fund Association?, PENSION FUND ASSOCIATION, https://www.pfa.or.jp/e
nglish/about/ [https://perma.cc/5QSY-FU5Z].
91. Overview and Approaches of Investments, PENSION FUND ASSOCIATION, https://www.pfa.or.jp
/english/about/investments/overview.html [https://perma.cc/N35F-7ELP].
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. GUIDELINES FOR THE EXERCISE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS, PENSION FUND
ASSOCIATION [hereinafter PFA PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES], https://www.pfa.or.jp/english/about/invest
ments/files/gov_e20101228.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8PC-6YZJ]. The PFA’s proxy voting guidelines, first
published in 2003, were influenced by “ideas from Anglo-American pension funds such as CalPERS,
TIAA-CREF, and Hermes (CalPERS’ partner in the United Kingdom.).” Jacoby, supra note 4, at 110–
11.
95. See PFA PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 1.
96. Martin Fackler, An Investor Activism Uncommon in Japan, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2007),
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in Japan have been much less anti-management than pension funds based in
the United States, such as the California Public Employees Retirement
System (“CalPERS”). Whereas the PFA voted in opposition to roughly fortynine percent of director appointments in Japan in 2004, United States
pensions opposed ninety-three percent of such proposals.97 Several
phenomena may explain the PFA’s tempered approach in its engagements
with management. Perhaps most significantly, as a domestic institution, the
PFA has been constrained by Japanese social, cultural and behavioral norms.
According to its former managing director, Tomomi Yano, the PFA could
not openly propose dismissals of directors or CEOs in the same manner as
Western pensions have. He further explained that such actions would draw
criticism from Japanese society;98 the PFA “[could not] be such an activist
as CalPERS”99 or other Western pension funds. These constraints tempered
the PFA’s proxy voting patterns and likely explain its preference for private
discussions with under-performing and under-paying firms, rather than
public battles or communication with management.100 Beyond establishing
objective standards for evaluating corporate governance, the PFA has also
highlighted models of effective management by establishing a “corporate
governance fund” in March of 2003.101 The fund was intended to create an
investment portfolio of the 50 listed companies with the best governance
practices among approximately 1,500 companies listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange.102 The PFA selected its portfolio companies after developing its
own evaluation standards, distributing governance questionnaires,103 and
undertaking onsite visits to interview listed companies.104 Although the
corporate governance fund was closed in February of 2009, it “‘[sent] a
message’ to corporate managers concerning the PFA’s expectation as to

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/30/business/worldbusiness/30investor.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/X
89H-DLH5].
97. Jacoby, supra note 4, at 111.
98. Interview with Kuny Kobayaschi, Director of Asian Development, Investor Responsibility
Research Center, in Tokyo, Japan (Mar. 17, 2005), cited in Jacoby, supra note 4, at 113 (“Noting that
CalPERS has on numerous occasions proposed a CEO dismissal, Yano said, ‘PFA cannot do such a thing
yet, though we want to. If we do, we will be criticized in the Japanese society.’”).
99. Id.
100. Jacoby, supra note 4, at 111.
101. Tomomi Yano, Exec. Managing Dir., Pension Fund Ass’n, Closing Keynote Speech, Asian
Business Dialogue on Corporate Governance 2007: Strengthening Companies and Capital Markets
through Corporate Governance: The Critical Role of Investors in Strengthening Corporate Governance
in Japan 3 (Nov. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Yano Keynote Speech].
102. Aronson, supra note 35, at 621.
103. Yano Keynote Speech, supra note 101.
104. Aronson, supra note 35, at 621.
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what constituted ‘good governance.’”105
C. Collaborative Activism
Collaborative activism incorporates a more intermediate style of
engagement than the adversarial or constructive approaches. Collaborative
activists generally apply a lighter touch in their engagements with firms by
lodging private arguments or disagreements with management,106 by
cooperating with other shareholders and by emphasizing a long-term interest
in target firms’ stability, rather than pursuing short-term payouts for
clientele. In essence, the engagements of collaborative activists are focused
less on shareholding for the sake of financial returns and more on
shareholding as a means of stakeholding, or undertaking a long-term
commitment to a target firm’s financial and social stability.
In sharp contrast to its strategies with United States-based target
firms,107 recent engagements in Japan by Third Point, LLC (“Third Point”)
are indicative of the collaborative approach. The hedge fund’s manager,
Daniel Loeb, has tactfully engaged Japanese firms over the last decade and
implemented a style of activism reliant on trust and long-term investormanagement relations, rather than firm-specific agitation and financial
payout. In May of 2013, Loeb hand-delivered to the board of Sony
Corporation a letter announcing Third Point’s majority ownership in the
company108 and proposing the company sell fifteen to twenty percent of its
ownership in Sony Entertainment, a separate division of the firm focusing
on television, motion picture production and music publishing.109 Rather
than a typical public offering, Loeb suggested that Sony undertake a
subscription rights offering to allow current shareholders to acquire direct
105. Id.
106. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 172 (contrasting the “aggressive and publicly
confrontational” approach of Steel Partners with firms such as Perry Corporation and Ichigo Asset
Management Ltd. that generally avoided public confrontation with target boards).
107. Third Point’s manager, Daniel Loeb, is well-known for his aggressive engagements with
management of Western target firms. In 2005, Loeb pointedly accused a CEO of a portfolio firm of
managerial ineptitude: “Sadly, your ineptitude is not limited to your failure to communicate with bond
and unit holders . . . your record reveals years of value destruction and strategic blunders which have led
us to dub you one of the most dangerous and incompetent executives in America.” Letter from Daniel S.
Loeb, Chief Exec. Officer of Third Point, LLC, to Irik P. Sevin, Chairman, President and Chief Exec.
Officer of Star Gas Partners L.P. (Feb. 14, 2005), reprinted in JEFF GRAMM, DEAR CHARIMAN:
BOARDROOM BATTLES AND THE RISE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 230 (2016).
108. Letter from Daniel Loeb, Chief Exec. Officer of Third Point, LLC, to Kazuo Hirai, President
and Chief Exec. Officer of Sony Corp. 1 (May 14, 2013) [hereinafter Letter from Daniel Loeb to Sony
Corp.]. As Sony’s largest shareholder at the time of Loeb’s letter, Third Point held approximately 64
million shares in the company valued at over ¥115 billion ($1.1 billion); ¥71 billion ($700 million) was
held through direct ownership. Id.
109. Id. at 2.
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ownership in the entertainment subsidiary.110 Loeb anticipated that such a
sale would “reward” the management of Sony Entertainment by offering
them shares “specifically tied to a company [under their] control” and would
therefore encourage them to improve the subsidiary’s financial
performance.111 Perhaps more significant than the practical and economic
justifications underlying Loeb’s proposal, the letter was framed in terms of
a partnership between shareholders and management to advance interests
beyond shareholder value. For example, Loeb argues in the letter’s closing
paragraphs that his approach to strengthen Sony “serves all of [the
company’s] stakeholders—employees, management, and fellow owners” by
“reduc[ing] debt, increase[ing] profitability, and creat[ing] significant
shareholder value.”112 The letter also concludes by stating “[Third Point] is
confident that by acting as partners, Sony will grow stronger.”113 While some
may discount Loeb’s statements as mere window dressing, Third Point’s
actions supported its manager’s collaborative tone—the Fund stood ready to
“ensure the success of [Loeb’s proposed] subscription rights offering” by
committing itself to a significant financial guarantee of Sony’s sale “up to
¥150–200 billion” ($1.5–2 billion).114 Third Point’s financial pledge
amounted to nearly fifteen percent of its assets under management and
underscored its commitment to supporting Sony’s long-term financial
stability.115
Although Loeb’s proposal was rejected by Sony’s board in August of
2013,116 the company nonetheless decided in November to cut costs and
prioritize its television operations.117 Similar engagements by Third Point
with other Japanese firms have facilitated successful governance reform. In
February of 2015, the Fund announced a dominant stake in Fanuc
Corporation (“Fanuc”)—an industrial Japanese robot manufacturer—and
requested that the company dispense greater cash dividends to
shareholders.118 Fanuc responded favorably by announcing two months later

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 3.
113. Id. at 4.
114. Id. at 2.
115. Inagaki, supra note 38.
116. Daniel Miller, Activist Investor Dan Loeb Sells Stake in Sony Corp., L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21,
2014), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-activist-investor-dan-loeb-sellsstake-in-sony-corp-20141021-story.html [https://perma.cc/6Q8E-6ZEV].
117. Id.
118. Eric Pfanner, Japanese Robot Maker Fanuc to Double Dividend, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 27, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fanuc-to-increase-dividends-after-push-by-activist-investor-daniel-loeb1430121007 [https://perma.cc/FHF8-VYBR].
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its plans to double cash dividends by distributing sixty percent of net profits
to investors; up from thirty percent previously.119
III. KEY BYPRODUCTS OF MODERN LEGISLATIVE REFORM &
FOREIGN INFLUENCE
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Japan has experienced
significant reform to its corporate law. This paper does not undertake to
explain Japan’s evolving standards of governance or to summarize the legal
developments underlying its current corporate governance regime. However,
this section focuses on two ‘byproducts’ of Japan’s recent corporate
evolution that will interact with its current array of activist strategies and
influence the future behavior of institutional investors.
Two byproducts of Japan’s reformation have the potential to influence
the future behavior of institutional investors. First, the Japanese Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry and Ministry of Justice published a set of
Guidelines in May of 2005 to clarify standards for reasonable defensive
maneuvers by management in Japanese companies. The Guidelines include
a list of specific scenarios in which defensive maneuvers are appropriate in
response to aggressive acquirers. Although the Guidelines were intended to
relax the defensive postures of management and establish a framework
enabling target firms to interact with outside investors, the inclusion of these
specific scenarios has ultimately invited stronger resistance by management
toward acquirers. As such, the Guidelines have created a significant obstacle
for aggressive activism in twenty-first century Japan; adversarial activists
must now contend with defensive measures sanctioned by the Japanese
government in addition to longstanding cultural friction and social hostility.
Second, a 2015 amendment to the Japanese Companies Act and the
passage in 2015 of a new Japanese Corporate Governance Code have
encouraged companies to increase independent board membership and
ensure that directors are subject to heightened accountability. These
governmental initiatives—greater board independence and heightened
accountability—have distanced Japanese companies from their “internalist”
roots, and have fundamentally altered the nature of Japanese corporate
governance. Interestingly, the government’s quest for greater board
independence may serve as a moderating influence on the defensive postures
supported by the aforementioned Guidelines of 2005. With greater board
independence and accountability, shareholders now have a meaningful role
in managerial decision-making and opportunities have emerged for
constructive engagement.
119.

Id.
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As these byproducts demonstrate, “significant norm shifts are under
way in Japan,”120 including greater emphasis on managerial oversight, “a
heightened awareness of shareholders’ economic expectations” and a
fundamental shift in perspectives on management’s “proper role in running
the firm.”121 These dynamics will play a crucial role in shaping the future
contours of engagements between shareholders and management.
A. Guidelines on Defensive Maneuvers to Counter Aggressive Acquirers
In September of 2004, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (“METI”) and the Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”) convened a
Corporate Value Study Group of experts and business representatives122 to
analyze Japan’s market for corporate control in response to an “increasing
threat of hostile takeovers.”123 The Study Group ultimately published a
Report in March of 2005 to develop a “framework for fair and reasonable
hostile takeover defensive measures that would enhance corporate and
shareholder value” based on globally-accepted Western standards.124 Most
significantly, the Report concluded that key principles of Delaware takeover
jurisprudence125 could be incorporated into existing Japanese law and it
expressly endorsed the “poison pill” shareholder rights plan as a legitimate
defensive mechanism available to management in Japanese firms.126 Prior to
the Report, Japanese firms rarely adopted defensive measures for fear that
share prices would react negatively or that the measures would be
impermissible under Japanese law.127 However, the Study Group’s report
provided government support for defensive maneuvers and encouraged
Japanese firms to adopt Western defense measures to replace traditional

120.
121.
122.

See Milhaupt, supra note 54, at 18.
Id.
MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUS. (METI): CORP. VALUE STUDY GRP., SUMMARY
OUTLINE OF DISCUSSION POINTS 1 (Mar. 2005) [hereinafter CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP
DISCUSSION POINTS], http://www.meti.go.jp/english/information/downloadfiles/Corporate%20Value.
pdf [https://perma.cc/M9BN-PR8N].
123. See Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 2172–73.
124. CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP DISCUSSION POINTS, supra note 122, at 1.
125. For example, the Report includes a two-pronged analysis to assess the reasonableness of
defensive measures. The Study Group’s test closely resembles Delaware’s Unocal Doctrine and asks (1)
whether a threat exists that may impair corporate value, and (2) whether the defensive measure adopted
is proportional to the threat posed. Id. at 8.
126. See id. at 15 (concluding that “[m]ost Western-style defense measures . . . are permissible in
Japan” and “[r]ights plans are possible through the [issuance] of Shinkabu Yoyakuken (warrant[s] to
subscribe for new shares)” following a board decision).
127. See id. at 5. According to an METI survey in September of 2004, the Report states that thirtythree percent of non-adopting Japanese firms were concerned over market reactions and thirty-one
percent were unsure of the legality of defensive measures under Japanese law. Id.
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cross-shareholding alignments.128 To aid Japanese firms in their defensive
maneuvers, the Report called upon the METI and MOJ to establish
guidelines for the reasonable implementation of defensive mechanisms.129
The METI and MOJ responded immediately and published a set of
Guidelines (the “METI-MOJ Guidelines,” or the “Guidelines”) for defensive
maneuvers in May of 2005.130 The Guidelines supplement existing
regulations in the Japanese Commercial Code131 and apply specifically to
defensive measures adopted in anticipation of “unsolicited takeover
proposal[s]”132 by outside investors. While not legally binding, the METIMOJ Guidelines have achieved wide acceptance among Japanese listed
companies133 and have affected a subtle shift in the focus of Japanese
corporate governance toward shareholder primacy.
The Guidelines rest on three basic principles: (1) the protection and
enhancement of corporate value and shareholder interests; (2) prior and full
disclosure out of respect for shareholders; and (3) a requirement that
defensive measures be necessary and reasonable in relation to threats posed
by outside investment.134 The principles have empowered shareholders and
fundamentally altered the nature of engagements between investors and
management. As the METI and MOJ note:
[I]f the Guidelines are shared and respected by . . . corporate managers,
shareholders, investors, stock exchanges, lawyers, financial advisors, etc.,
they will facilitate a major change in the Japanese business community
and lead to the enhancement of corporate value. More specifically, they
will lead to the establishment of corporate management focused on the
interests of shareholders, active use and independence of external board
members, establishment of procedures to reasonably investigate takeover
proposals, improved procedures governing shareholders meetings,
exercise of responsibility by institutional investors, and consensus-

128. See id. at 3 (recognizing a “dissolution” of traditional cross-shareholding alignments and a
subsequent “desire of Japanese corporations” to seek replacement defense mechanisms).
129. See id. at 16.
130. MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUS. & MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES REGARDING
TAKEOVER DEFENSE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT OF CORPORATE VALUE
AND SHAREHOLDERS’ COMMON INTERESTS [hereinafter METI-MOJ TAKEOVER DEFENSE GUIDELINES]
(May 27, 2005), http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/keiei_innovation/keizaihousei/pdf/shishin_hont
ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2BL-QLPH].
131. ENRICO COLCERA, THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL IN JAPAN: M&AS, HOSTILE
TAKEOVERS AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 193 (2007).
132. METI-MOJ TAKEOVER DEFENSE GUIDELINES, supra note 130, at 1.
133. Nels Hansen, Japan’s First Poison Pill Case, Bulldog Sauce v. Steel Partners: A Comparative
and Institutional Analysis, 26 J. JAPAN L. 139, 144 (2008).
134. See METI-MOJ TAKEOVER DEFENSE GUIDELINES, supra note 130, at 3.
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building between corporate managers and investors about the long-term
enhancement of corporate values.135

The Guidelines were promulgated in hopes that they would offer a
“code of conduct”136 for the Japanese business community in response to
engagements by outside investors. The first principle above (i.e. the
protection of corporate value and shareholder interests) is particularly
significant given its effect on engagements between outside investors and
management. In explaining the first principle, the Guidelines recognize as
“legitimate and reasonable” any defensive measures designed to “protect . . .
shareholder interests by preventing certain shareholders from acquiring a
controlling stake” in a Japanese listed company.137 In a supplemental note,
the METI and MOJ offer specific examples of reasonable defensive
measures, including measures to prevent takeovers by acquirers (a) seeking
to accumulate shares with the intention of requiring a “buy back” at a higher
price by the target firm, (b) pursuing temporary control of a target firm for
their own financial benefit and to the firm’s detriment, (c) seeking to pledge
the target firm’s assets as collateral for the debts of the acquirer, or (d)
pursuing temporary control of management in a target firm so as to sell assets
and dispense dividends to the acquirer’s shareholders.138 By listing these
examples and “blessing” managerial hostility to aggressive acquirers, the
Guidelines—although designed to facilitate cooperative engagement, or
“consensus-building,”139 between management and outside investors—have
arguably hardened the defensive posture of management toward aggressive
acquirers seeking short-term extraction of financial gain. The Japanese
government’s acquiescence in this regard, as discussed in Part IV below,
likely imposes significant obstacles for adversarial activists seeking to
acquire shares in Japanese listed companies.
B. Greater Emphasis on Independent Board Membership & Accountability
Along with the METI-MOJ Guidelines, significant changes to Japan’s
standards of corporate governance will also influence future engagements
between shareholders and management. Two developments in particular are
significant in this regard: an amendment to the Japanese Companies Act
offering firms an alternative governance model, and the adoption in 2015 of
a new Corporate Governance Code.
135. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id. at 4, Note 1(i)(a)–(d). Note 1 also recognizes as legitimate any defensive measures designed
to prevent “coercive, two-tiered takeovers,” or to ensure time and negotiating power for target firms. Id.
at Note 1(ii), (iii).
139. Id. at 3.
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Over the last two decades, amendments to Japanese corporate law have
focused on specific topics such as merger procedures, managerial liability,
share repurchase rights, and shareholder derivative suits.140 However, in June
of 2014, the Japanese Diet published an amendment to the Japanese
Companies Act141 intended to overhaul the country’s corporate governance
regime. The Amendment (hereinafter, the “Reform Act”) took effect in May
of 2015 and aimed to improve accountability among management in listed
companies.142 Most importantly, the Reform Act appears primed to facilitate
open communication between shareholders and management, and to position
investors to agitate for governance reform.
Prior to the Reform Act, Japanese law prescribed two traditional
governance regimes for listed companies: (1) the “Company with Board of
Company Auditors” regime composed of a board of at least three statutory
auditors,143 a majority of whom were required to be “outside company
auditors;”144 and (2) the “Company with Committees” regime composed of
nominating, compensation, and audit committees,145 each with a majority of
“outside directors.”146 Japanese firms were authorized to adopt either regime,
but most preferred the “Board of Company Auditors” approach; firms were
hesitant to entrust outside directors under the “Committee” regime with
authority to nominate and determine the compensation of management.147
This preference for outside company auditors and the “Board of Company
Auditors” approach, rather than outside directors under the “Company with
Committees” approach, may also be explained by the limited supervisory

140. See Milhaupt, supra note 54, at 4–11 (documenting various amendments to the Japanese
Commercial Code from 1993 to 2002).
141. 会社法[Companies Act of Japan], Act No. 86 of 2005 [hereinafter Japanese Companies Act].
142. See Masamichi Sakamoto & Yohei Harima, Companies Act Reform 2014: Can the New
Amendment to the Companies Act of Japan Strengthen the Corporate Governance Systems of Japanese
Listed Companies?, CITY-YUWA PARTNERS 56 (June 2014), http://www.city-yuwa.com/english/publicati
on/shared/PDF/JLG201415_cy_56-59.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4ZU-HBBT].
143. Japanese Companies Act, supra note 141, at art. 2(x).
144. Id. at art. 2(xvi) (defining “outside company auditor”); see also id. at art. 335(3) (“A Company
with Board of Company Auditors shall have three or more company auditors, and . . . half or more of
them shall be Outside Company Auditors.”).
145. Id. at art. 2(xii).
146. Id. at art. 400(3). The Japanese Companies Act generally defines an “outside director” as a
director of a listed company who is not an Executive Director, Executive Officer, manager, or other
employee of the company or of a subsidiary, and who has not been an Executive Director of the company
or of a subsidiary for ten years prior to assuming office. See id. at art. 2(xv).
147. Sakamoto & Harima, supra note 142, at 58.
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function of auditors148 and the de facto subordination of auditors under
Japanese law.149
The Reform Act offered a third alternative arrangement: the “Company
with Audit and Supervisory Committee” regime.150 Under this regime,
companies must establish an “audit and supervisory committee”151 of at least
three directors, the majority of which are outside directors. The committee is
authorized to monitor and prepare reports on the performance of directors,152
and to develop a committee opinion to be expressed at shareholders’
meetings with regards to the appointment, removal and remuneration of noncommittee member directors.153 Members of the committee are further
authorized to request that directors report on matters related to the execution
of their duties and to investigate the status of their company’s business or
assets.154 On a fundamental level, the audit and supervisory committee
provides firms a mechanism to improve managerial oversight and facilitate
shareholder accountability.
In conjunction with the Reform Act’s audit and supervisory committee
regime, Japan’s recently enacted Corporate Governance Code155 imposes an
obligation on all companies operating under a traditional “Company with
Board of Company Auditors” regime to appoint at least one independent
director, or else explain to shareholders in an annual corporate governance
report why such an appointment is inappropriate.156 While the effect of a
single independent director may prove minimal, since the “Company with
Board of Company Auditors” regime is ubiquitous among Japanese listed
firms,157 the comply-or-explain approach pressures the majority of firms to
embrace director oversight, or else answer to shareholders.158 Thus, although
148. See Japanese Companies Act, supra note 141, at art. 381 (explaining auditors’ authority to audit
directors’ performance and prepare “audit reports”).
149. See also id. at art. 382 (requiring auditors to report to directors if they uncover misconduct or
legal violations by directors).
150. Japanese Companies Act, supra note 141, at art. 2(xi)-2; see also id. at arts. 399-2 to 399-12.
151. Japanese Companies Act, supra note 141, at art. 399-2.
152. Id. at art. 399-2(3)(i).
153. Id. at art. 399-2(3)(iii).
154. Id. at art. 399-3(1).
155. TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE: SEEKING
SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE GROWTH AND INCREASED CORPORATE VALUE OVER THE MID- TO LONGTERM (2015) [hereinafter JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE], http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/eq
uities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jdy-att/20150513.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH5Q-AC6Y].
156. See id. at 34–35 (explaining the “Comply-or-Explain” approach).
157. Sakamoto & Harima, supra note 142, at 58.
158. Id. at 57 (“A company may find it very difficult to explain the reason why it believes that the
appointment of an outside director is not appropriate. The absence of an appropriate person to serve as an
outside director, for example, would not be a valid reason under the Reform Act. According to an officer
of the Ministry of Justice . . . a company will be required to show that the appointment of an outside
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the Reform Act stopped short of requiring firms to adopt the new
“supervisory committee” system, Japanese law has indirectly promoted a
degree of board independence and accountability among firms with
traditional governance regimes.
While the Reform Act is a recent development and its effects have yet
to be measured, data on listed companies gathered by the Tokyo Stock
Exchange (“TSE”) illustrate a steady trend toward independent board
membership since 2008. Among listed firms organized under the “Company
with Board of Auditors” regime (also known as companies with kansayaku,
or statutory auditors), 63.8% had appointed at least one outside director in
2014, up from 44.1% in 2008.159 Among firms organized under the
“Company with Committees” regime—and thus required to appoint a
majority of outside directors to each committee160—the total number of
outside directors appointed has gradually increased; 80.8% had appointed
more than four outside directors in 2014, compared with only 58.3% in
2008.161 These trends are particularly pronounced among firms with the
largest foreign shareholding ratios, suggesting that foreign investors have
imported Western preferences for board independence and accountability.
Among firms with the highest percentage of foreign shareholding (30% or
greater), 26% appointed at least one-third of their directors as outside
directors in 2014, up from 23.7% in 2012.162 The Reform Act and its
supervisory committee regime is likely to bolster Japan’s current progression
toward greater board independence and accountability among listed
companies.
In a more recent development, a new Corporate Governance Code163
(the “Code”) took effect on June 1, 2015 as part of the Japanese
government’s Revitalization Strategy to enhance corporate governance and
promote economic growth.164 Preliminary discussions of the draft Code were
director will have a negative impact on the company. As this is a high hurdle to leap, the ‘comply or
explain’ rule set to be implemented under the Reform Act . . . will oblige listed companies to appoint
outsider directors as a matter of practice.”).
159. TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 2015, at Chart 25 [hereinafter 2015 WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE],
http://www.jpx.co.jp/equities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jb0-att/2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4ML-VWJH
].
160. Japanese Companies Act, supra note 141, at art. 400(3).
161. 2015 WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 159, at Chart 27.
162. Id. at Chart 31.
163. JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 155.
164. Ken Kiyohara et al., Japanese Corporate Governance is Changing with the Adoption of a New
Code in 2015: Commentary, JONES DAY (Feb. 2015), http://www.jonesday.com/Japanese-CorporateGovernance-Is-Changing-with-the-Adoption-of-a-New-Code-in-2015-02-03-2015/?RSS=true [https://p
erma.cc/M2Y4-45XJ].
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led by a Council of Experts, established by the TSE and Japan’s Financial
Services Agency (“FSA”) to consult with the private sector.165 The final
version of the Code sets forth seventy-three principles of effective corporate
governance166 and listed firms are expected (after conducting an independent
governance examination and submitting an annual “corporate governance
report” to the TSE) either to comply with each principle, or else submit a
“non-compliance explanation.”167
A substantial portion of the Code encourages constructive dialogue
between shareholders and management in pursuit of long-term corporate
growth.168 In particular, Section Five of the Code (“Dialogue with
Shareholders”) encourages collaboration and essentially warns against a
return to the culture of internalism that dominated Japanese firms in the past.
To this point, the Code recognizes that management and directors “have
opportunities to interact . . . with employees, business partners and financial
institutions on a daily basis,” but typically remain insulated from
shareholders.169 Rather than resist interactions with shareholders, the Code
encourages management to respond reasonably to shareholders’ requests and
interests.170
While the Code’s long term influence remains undetermined, data
gathered by the TSE suggest that its governance principles have already
gained acceptance among a majority of Japanese firms. As of July 14, 2016,
3,164 Japanese listed companies have submitted corporate governance
reports detailing the extent of their compliance with the Corporate
Governance Code.171
Among the Code’s seventy-three principles, only twelve had
compliance rates of less than ninety percent among the 2,262 companies
165. See Stephen Mulrenan, Japanese Corporate Governance: A Matter of Principle,,
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASS’N (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=39c1
745e-cbaf-45f1-a67a-b03c9753e829 [https://perma.cc/52K9-84NX] (“A draft of the new code was
finalized on 5 March, following consultation overseen by Japan’s Council of Experts Concerning the
Corporate Governance Code, headed by the country’s Financial Services Agency (FSA) and the TSE.”).
166. These Principles are subdivided into five “General Principles,” each accompanied by a set of
“Principles” and “Supplementary Principles.” See TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., HOW LISTED
COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 4 (Sept. 13, 2016) [hereinafter
HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE],
http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jdy-att/b5b4pj000001akx0.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/D7VL-YAE3].
167. See id. at 2.
168. JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 155, at 26.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 27.
171. See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE
supra note 166, at 2. The number of reporting companies increased by 21.5% (an additional 679
companies) from December of 2015. Id.
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listed on the first and second sections of the TSE.172 According to TSE
data,173 the principles with the lowest compliance rates involve requirements
for full disclosure of company objectives, governance views, and board
nomination policies,174 the implementation of a “mid-term business plan,”175
appropriate oversight of succession planning for executives,176 and the
inclusion of compensation incentives for management reflecting mid- to
long-term business results.177 The most controversial principles (those with
exceedingly low compliance rates) were the obligation to provide
shareholders an “electronic voting platform” (44.25% compliance)178 and
annual evaluations of directors (55.04% compliance).179 Most significantly,
none of the principles or supplementary principles relating to engagements
with shareholders exhibited compliance rates below ninety percent.180 In
fact, only one of the six principles relating to shareholder engagement
exhibited a compliance rate of less than ninety-eight percent.181 These data
suggest that the vast majority of Japanese listed firms intend to comply with
the Corporate Governance Code’s preference for collaborative engagement
between shareholders and management. While the actual practices of
Japanese firms and the effect of the Code remain undetermined, these data
highlight a baseline of cooperation that has emerged to guide future
shareholder-management relations.

172. See id. at 4.
173. See id.
174. See id. (referencing “P3-1,” or Principle 3.1 of Japan’s Corporate Governance Code, supra note
155, at 14).
175. See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE,
supra note 166, at 4 (referencing “SP4-1-2,” or Supplementary Principle 4.1.2 of Japan’s Corporate
Governance Code, supra note 155, at 18).
176. See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE
supra note 166, at 4 (referencing “SP4-1-3,” or Supplementary Principle 4.1.3 of Japan’s Corporate
Governance Code, supra note 155, at 18).
177. See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE,
supra note 166, at 4 (referencing “P4-2,” or Principle 4.2 of Japan’s Corporate Governance Code, supra
note 155, at 18).
178. See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE,
supra note 166, at 4 (referencing “SP1-2-4,” or Supplementary Principle 1.2.4 of Japan’s Corporate
Governance Code, supra note 155, at 7).
179. See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE,
supra note 166, at 4 (referencing “SP4-11-3,” or Supplementary Principle 4.11.3 of Japan’s Corporate
Governance Code, supra note 155, at 23).
180. See HOW LISTED COMPANIES HAVE ADDRESSED JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE,
supra note 166, at 4.
181. See id. All principles relating to shareholder engagement exhibited a compliance rate of greater
than 98%, except for Principle 5.2, requiring the disclosure of earnings plans and capital policies (90.14%
compliance). Id.
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IV. A SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER & IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FUTURE
Taken together, these byproducts of Japan’s twenty-first century
transformation appear likely to mitigate the influence of adversarial activism
while empowering constructive and collaborative activists in their
engagements with Japanese firms. As scholars have recognized, Japan’s
market for aggressive activism and hostile takeovers has proven
“enigmatic.”182 Despite increasing volumes of takeover activity in Western
jurisdictions,183 Japan’s market for hostile takeovers has remained
lukewarm.184 Although Japan exhibits many characteristics of an attractive
takeover market (e.g., a variety of independent public companies with
dispersed share ownership), it has become the antithesis of Western,
takeover-centric regimes.185 In proportion to Japan’s gross domestic product,
foreign direct investment in Japanese companies stood at 3.4% as of 2012,
compared with an average of 30.6% for all other member states of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”).186
While this data is not directly indicative of a slow market for hostile
takeovers by foreign institutional investors, the fact that foreign investment
remains well below OECD standards lends credence to the viewpoint that
Japan has diverged from Western takeover-centrism.
In Japan’s current investment climate, the aggressive approach of
adversarial activists faces significant obstacles. Directors of Japanese
companies are authorized by the METI and MOJ to bolster their defenses
against aggressive acquirers. Further, the “code of conduct” envisioned by
the METI-MOJ Guidelines and Japan’s new Corporate Governance Code
essentially predisposes management of target companies against adversarial
182. See generally Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, The Enigma of Hostile Takeovers
in Japan: Bidder Beware (National Univ. of Singapore, Centre for Asian Studies Working Paper No.
16/03, 2016).
183. See generally DANIELLE CARBONE, DAVID CONNOLLY, STEPHEN GLOVE, DOREEN
LILIENFELD, & RORY O’HALLORAN, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE &
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION SURVEY 2 (2015), http://shearman.uberflip.com/i/581575-2015-corporate-g
overnance-executive-compensation-survey/0 [https://perma.cc/VM83-FHFE] (recognizing “a substantial
increase in publicly disclosed shareholder activist activity at the Top 100 [U.S.] Companies, with activist
campaigns increasing 33%—from six companies in 2014 to eight companies in 2015” and predicting that
“activists will continue to look toward larger targets” as capital flows are allocated to the “activist fund
asset class”).
184. See generally Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 182 (documenting the underlying reasons
for the “enigma” of Japan’s subdued market for hostile takeovers).
185. See Dan W. Puchniak, The Efficiency of Friendliness: Japanese Corporate Governance
Succeeds Again Without Hostile Takeovers, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 195, 201 (2008) (characterizing
Japan’s early twenty-first century transformation and resulting governance regime as “the antithesis” of
the American takeover-centric governance model).
186. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 2 (June 2014).
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activists by encouraging a focus on long-term corporate value187 rather than
the short-term profits typically sought by aggressive investors. In light of
increasing costs and greater resistance from management, adversarial
institutions have begun to exit the Japanese market altogether.188 Under
Japan’s modern standards of corporate governance, aggressive forms of
engagement are quickly becoming a ‘lost art.’ By contrast, activists seeking
less-hostile, cooperative means of influence face far fewer obstacles than
their adversarial counterparts. Recently, the collaborative strategies of Third
Point, LLC, Taiyo Pacific Partners (another United States-based firm) and
numerous other institutions have demonstrated significant progress in
promoting governance reform within Japanese target companies.189 Recent
interactions between institutional investors and management have focused
on long-term investment goals, and the Japanese public has taken notice.190
Despite the likelihood of coordination between cooperative investors
and target firms, it remains to be seen whether stakeholder and cultural
constraints on managers under the remnants of Japan’s former keiretsu
system may ultimately prove stronger than the system of collaboration and
engagement introduced by the regulatory changes discussed above. This
question will turn primarily on the evolving role of outside directors in
Japan’s culture of conformity. Will outside directors be empowered to
operate independently of the “community firm” and traditional norms of
firm-centrism? Or, will the independent oversight of outside directors be

187. See METI-MOJ TAKEOVER DEFENSE GUIDELINES, supra note 130, at 3 (recognizing the
importance of “consensus-building” between managers and investors on enhancing long-term corporate
values).
188. See, e.g., 2015 Letter to Shareholders of Steel Partners, supra note 47, at 14 (app. A) (notifying
shareholders of full divestment of holdings in Aderans Holdings Co. Ltd.—the Fund’s last remaining
investment in Japan); Atsuko Fukase, Cerberus Sells Big Chunk of Seibu Stake: Unloading of Stake Worth
More than $800 Million is U.S. Firm’s Latest Japan Asset Sale, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/cerberus-sells-830-million-chunk-of-seibu-stake-1432279872 [https://perm
a.cc/6QRC-HG6R] (documenting the sale of Japanese assets by Cerberus Capital Management LP, a U.S.
private equity fund, including the sale of its entire stake in Aozora Bank Ltd., the sale of its fifty-five
percent ownership in Kokusai Kogyo Co., and the sale a large portion of its stake in Seibu Holdings Inc.
The article credits “a clash of Japanese and Western corporate cultures” as a contributing factor to
Cerberus’ disputes with Japanese management and subsequent market exit.).
189. Ritsuko Ando, ‘Friendly’ Activist Wins Japan’s Trust as Hostile Funds Struggle, REUTERS
(May 16, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/japan-investment-idUSL3N0O116T20140516 [https://p
erma.cc/RQ2F-QA7L] (describing the approach of Taiyo’s manager, Brian Haywood, in engaging with
Roland Corporation, a Japanese musical instrument manufacturer. Haywood’s cooperative approach led
to a management buyout in order to privatize Roland and guide it successfully through restructuring).
190. See id. (acknowledging “the rise of a new and friendly style of shareholder activism in Japan,
where funds such as Steel Partners have grappled with a conservative corporate culture criticised for
prioritising long-standing business ties over shareholder returns.”); Inagaki, supra note 38 (“The key to
success, in a country where domestic shareholders still tend to rally around management to repel
outsiders, is a soft touch and shrewd tactics, say corporate-governance experts.”).
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limited by traditional Japanese internalism, perpetuating the insular nature
of the historical Japanese firm? This question remains unresolved and will
likely attract greater attention as Japanese corporate governance evolves.
Nonetheless, given the changes ushered in by the Japanese government’s
recent initiatives, investors no longer appear best served by agitating for premeditated, narrow-purpose governance reform in order to secure short-term
profitability and extract financial returns for shareholders. Rather,
institutional investors navigating Japan’s current governance framework are
strongly encouraged to assume a broader stake in the long-term financial
stability of domestic Japanese firms, and to act as stakeholders rather than
shareholders.

